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Abstract
This study develops a novel framework of heterogeneous producer attitudes towards risk to
analyze different, stated and revealed, roles of crop insurance premium subsidies and
underlying policy objectives of the government. The analysis reveals a strong connection
and a complementarity between the roles of premium subsidies in increasing producer participation in crop insurance, inducing a desired separating equilibrium in the presence of
asymmetric information, and transferring income to agricultural producers participating in
the program. Developing an alternative design of premium subsidies that can achieve the
stated government objective of increased producer participation and induce any desired
separating equilibrium at significantly reduced costs, our study rejects the idea that the
income redistribution taking place under the current policy design is necessary for increasing producer participation in crop insurance. Indeed, the current policy design reveals that
premium subsidies are either a means of income redistribution or a policy failure.
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Introduction
The U.S. federal crop insurance is a major farm policy aimed at providing risk protection/
reduced risk exposure to agricultural producers [1, 2]. A key component of this policy is the
provision of multiple contract options and subsidies that reduce the cost of insurance to agricultural producers [3–6]. Premium subsidies accounted for $6.26 billion in government outlays in 2019, with $2 billion being applied to coverage levels of 80% and higher [7]. While the
government has justified the use of premium subsidies as a necessary means of increasing producer participation in crop insurance [4, 8–14], many have argued that premium subsidies are
just another means of income redistribution from taxpayers to producers [5, 6, 15–17]. As
pointed out by an anonymous reviewer and many of the cited studies, key reasons behind the
government objective of increased producer participation in crop insurance have been a desire
to reduce adverse selection, increase the accuracy of premium rates, and eliminate ad-hoc
disaster payment programs.
Given the significant producer heterogeneity with respect to attitudes towards risk [18–21]
and the fact that these attitudes are private information, an argument can also be made that
premium subsidies are a means of resolving this information asymmetry and inducing certain
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insurance contract choices by producers. Indeed, the provision of multiple insurance contracts
reveals the government’s objective of inducing a separating equilibrium (where producers
select from a menu of contracts based on their risk preferences) and the premium subsidies
represent a necessary means of achieving this objective.
The objective of this study is to analyze and evaluate all different policy objectives/roles of
premium subsidies and improve our understanding of the relationship between the stated and
revealed government objectives and the role of premium subsidies in achieving these
objectives.
To study the role of premium subsidies in crop insurance policy design and implementation, our study develops a novel framework of analysis that explicitly accounts for the empirically relevant heterogeneity in producer attitudes towards risk and the multiple insurance
options/contracts available to them. The explicit consideration of heterogeneous producer risk
preferences is important in understanding the partial producer participation in crop insurance, differences in producer choices regarding insurance coverage as well as the asymmetric
effects of the policy on producers with different risk preferences.
The analysis reveals a strong connection and a complementarity between the stated and
revealed policy objectives of the government. Using insights from our model, we identify an
alternative design of premium subsidies that can achieve the stated government objective of
increased producer participation and induce any desired separating equilibrium at reduced
costs. The existence of such a mechanism rejects the idea that the income redistribution taking
place under the current policy design is necessary for increasing producer participation in
crop insurance.
Overall, our manuscript makes three contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a
novel framework of analysis that effectively captures the empirically relevant heterogeneity in
producer attitudes towards risk (which has been ignored by the relevant literature) as well as
the tradeoffs involved in producer insurance decisions in a parsimonious manner. Second, it
develops and proposes an alternative design of the crop insurance policy mechanism that can
increase producer participation (which is the stated goal of the program) and induce any separating equilibrium at significantly lower costs. Third, by developing this new policy design, the
analysis reveals that the premium subsidies in the current policy design are either a means of
income redistribution or a policy failure.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows. The next section provides some background information on the importance of premium subsidies in the evolution of crop insurance. Next, we introduce the theoretical framework of heterogeneous producer attitudes
towards risk and analyze the producer decisions and welfare under the crop insurance policy.
We then discuss the different roles of the premium subsidies in crop insurance, and present a
policy design that can achieve increased producer participation and any desired separating
equilibrium at reduced taxpayer costs. The final section summarizes and concludes the study.

Background information on crop insurance and premium subsidies
The inception of the Federal Crop Insurance Program dates back to 1938, when it was initiated
as a risk protection mechanism following the dust bowl and unsuccessful attempts by the private industry to provide insurance to agricultural producers [22]. Crop insurance as part of the
U.S. Federal Government farm program started as a pilot program with limited crop and
regional insurance coverage, low producer participation and high loss experience. After a
phase of program experimentation and amendments intended to improve a costly program
with low producer participation, the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 introduced premium
subsidies as well as new forms of policy coverage and insured crops [23].
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Subsequent legislative reforms focusing on the structure and magnitude of premium subsidies further increased the size and scope of the program that ended up providing nationwide
multi-peril crop insurance coverage for almost all available crops and commodities. Most
notable among those reforms are the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that
increased premium subsidies to enhance producer participation in the program [23, 24], the
1996 Farm Act that approved the development and provision of revenue-based policies [14,
24], and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) that provided $8.2 billion for the
development of new insurance products and additional premium subsidies [15]. ARPA
changed also the structure of premium subsidies for revenue-based policies from fixed per
acre dollar amounts to percentage shares of the premiums, the same subsidy structure found
in yield-based policies [25]. The subsequent increase in producer participation rates in new
insurance products covering new crops and new areas, and the selection of higher insurance
coverage options have resulted in a program that grew from $200 million in premium subsidies in 1989 to $6.26 billion in premium subsidies in 2019 [4, 5, 7].

Theoretical framework–producer characteristics and behavior
Due to differences in their attitudes towards risk and level of risk aversion, agricultural producers differ in the costs they incur for being involved in a risky endeavor like agricultural production. The greater a producer’s aversion to risk, the greater the perceived costs of operating/
producing under a given level of risk exposure, and the lower the expected net returns to production [26]. To reduce their exposure to risk (and, through this, their costs of operating in a
risky environment), producers can purchase a crop insurance contract at the beginning of the
production year. The greater the risk protection/reduction in risk exposure provided by a crop
insurance contract, the greater the premium associated with the procurement of the contract.
To capture these elements, consider a continuum of agricultural producers differing in the
level of their aversion to risk that have the choice between self-insuring, purchasing a low-coverage insurance policy, and purchasing a high-coverage policy. Note that, in reality, there are
multiple insurance policies with different levels of risk coverage available to producers. While
our model can be easily adapted to consider a large number of crop insurance contracts, such
consideration would complicate the analysis without affecting the qualitative nature of our
results.
Let A 2 [0.1] be the attribute that differentiates producers with greater values of A corresponding to greater aversion to risk. The expected net returns associated with the different
options for the producer with differentiating attribute A are given by:
ERsi ¼ ERP

bA

ERl ¼ ERP

wl

ERh ¼ ERP

wh

under self insurance
gA
dA

under low coverage crop insurance

ð1Þ

under high coverage crop insurance

where ERsi, ERl and ERh are the expected net returns from agricultural production under
self-insurance, low-coverage crop insurance and high-coverage crop insurance, respectively; ERP are the expected returns to agricultural production that are common across producers; wl and wh are the costs of low-coverage and high-coverage crop insurance,
respectively, with wh > wl and β, γ and δ are risk exposure parameters capturing the producer risk exposure under self-insurance, low-coverage crop insurance and high-coverage
crop insurance, respectively. The ERP are given by (p-c)q where p is the farm price of the
agricultural product, c is the cost of producing this product, and q is the quantity produced.
Depending on the source of uncertainty (i.e., whether there is price, cost or yield uncertainty), the parameters p, c and q would represent the expected price, expected cost and
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expected output, respectively. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the expected
returns to production could vary among the different insurance options if, due to moral
hazard, the procurement of insurance affected producers’ effort and production decisions.
While consideration of differences in the expected returns to production would complicate
the analysis, it would not affect the results of our study.
To capture the reduction in risk exposure due to insurance coverage, we assume that β > γ
> δ. In this context, βA, γA and δA represent the costs associated with (risky) agricultural production under the different insurance options for the producer with differentiating attribute
A. The greater the riskiness of agricultural production/producer exposure to risk and/or the
greater the producer aversion to risk, the greater the producer costs of being involved in this
risky endeavor.
The producer insurance decision depends on the relative expected net returns associated
with self-insurance, low-coverage crop insurance and high-coverage crop insurance. Fig 1
graphs ERsi, ERl and ERh for the empirically relevant case where the different insurance options
enjoy positive shares of the market.
The producer with risk aversion

Al : ERsi ¼ ERl ) Al ¼

wl
b

g

ð2Þ

is indifferent between self-insurance and low-coverage crop insurance as the expected net
returns associated with the two options are the same. Similarly, the producer with

Fig 1. Producer insurance decisions and welfare.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250129.g001
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differentiating attribute

Ah : ERl ¼ ERh ) Ah ¼

wh
g

wl
d

ð3Þ

is indifferent between the low-coverage and the high-coverage insurance options.
Producers with relatively low risk aversion (i.e., producers with A 2[0.Al)) prefer to selfinsure, producers with intermediate levels of risk aversion A 2 (Al, Ah) prefer the low-coverage
crop-insurance, while more risk averse producers with A 2 (Ah,1] prefer the high-coverage
crop insurance. Assuming, for simplicity and without loss of generality, that producers are uniformly distributed with respect to their aversion to risk, Al gives the share of producers that
prefer to self-insure, xsi ; Ah—Al is the share of producers that buy low-coverge crop insurance,
xl ; and 1 − Ah is the share of producers that prefer the high-coverage crop insurance, xh. Mathematically, xsi, xl and xh are given by:

xsi ¼

xl ¼

wl
b

ð4Þ

g

wh ðb gÞ wl ðb dÞ
ðb gÞðg dÞ

xh ¼

ðg

dÞ
g

ðwh
d

wl Þ

ð5Þ

ð6Þ

The greater the reduction in risk exposure and/or the lower the costs associated with the lowcoverage crop insurance, the greater the share of producers that find it optimal to participate
in crop insurance. Similarly, the greater the reduction in risk exposure and/or the lower the
costs associated with a particular crop insurance contract, the greater the share of producers
that prefer this crop insurance contract.
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that, in the spirit of [27], our simple model captures the essence of risk aversion and its impact, along with risk exposure,
on crop insurance decisions without adhering to expected utility theory and its calibration/scaling limitations [28, 29]. This is particularly important in our case as agricultural
producers can enrol from a few hundrend to thousands of acres in crop insurance. In addition to depicting the insurance decisions of heterogeneous agricultural producers, the area
under the effective (dashed and kinked) expected net returns curve in Fig 1 graphs also the
welfare of different producers under the different insurance options. Specifically, the welfare of producers that self-insure, producers that buy low-coverage crop insurance, and
producers that buy high-coverage crop insurance (denoted by PWsi, PWl and PWh,
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respectively) are given by:
ZAl
PWsi ¼

ERsi dA

ð7Þ

ERl dA

ð8Þ

ERh dA

ð9Þ

0

ZAh
PWl ¼
Al

Z1
PWh ¼
Ah

These welfare measures will become important when we discuss the distributional impacts
of premium subsidies.

The role of premium subsidies in crop insurance
As noted earlier, an important component of the crop insurance policy are the premium subsidies for the different crop insurance contract options. These premium subsidies are designed
to reduce the insurance costs to producers and, in their presence, the producer expected net
returns function becomes:
ERsi ¼ ERP

bA

ERls ¼ ERP

wl ð1

ERhs ¼ ERP

wh ð1

under self insurance
sl Þ
sh Þ

gA
dA

under low coverage crop insurance

ð10Þ

under high coverage crop insurance

where sl and sh are the government determined premium subsidies for low- and high-coverage
crop insurance, respectively. These subsidies are proportional to the insurance costs/premiums
wl and wh taking, therefore, values between 0 and 1, and decline as coverage levels increase
(i.e., sl > sh). The greater is the value of a premium subsidy, the lower the costs of the specific
crop insurance coverage contract, and the greater the expected net returns associated with this
ls
hs
insurance contract, i.e., @ER
> 0 and @ER
> 0.
@sl
@sh
All other variables are as defined previously. Fig 2 graphs the impact of premium subsidies
on the producer expected net returns associated with the different insurance options with the
dashed curves depicting the expected returns associated with the low- and high-coverage crop
insurance in the presence of the subsidies. While the study focuses on the introduction of new
subsidies, the analysis is more general and applies also to cases where the government increases
the magnitude of its existing subsidies.

Premium subsidies as means of increasing producer participation in crop
insurance
As shown in Fig 2, by reducing the insurance costs to producers, the introduction of the
premium subsidies causes an upward parallel shift of the expected net returns curves associated with the crop insurance options. Regarding the increased producer participation in
crop insurance, which, as noted earlier, is a key stated government objective of the utilization of premium subsidies, our model shows that subsidizing the low-coverage crop insurance does result in increased producer participation in the program. Specifically, the
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Fig 2. Market and welfare effects of premium subsidies when slwl < shwh.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250129.g002

increased expected net returns in the presence of the subsidies result in increased producer
0
participation in the program by Al Al in Fig 2 as producers with differentiating attribute/
0
level of risk aversion A 2 ðAl ; Al � that were initially self-insuring find it optimal to purchase
low-coverage crop insurance in the presence of the premium subsidies. Mathematically,
the increase in the producer participation in the presence of the premium subsidies is
given by

Al

0

Al ¼

wl sl
b g

ð11Þ

The greater the premium subsidy for low-coverage crop insurance, the greater the share of
producers that find it optimal to participate in crop insurance.
Result 1: The introduction of crop insurance premium subsidies increases producer participation in the policy, which is the stated goal of the government.
Crop insurance data from the Risk Management Agency (RMA), available in S1 Data, is
consistent with the positive impact of premium subsidies on producer participation in crop
insurance over time [7]. Through the implementation of several legislative acts expanding premium subsidies, the crop insurance program grew from $254.8 million in premium subsidies
for 99.6 million insured acres in 1994 to $6.26 billion in premium subsidies for 769 million
insured acres in 2019.
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Premium subsidies as means of inducing a desirable separating
equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information
The provision of multiple crop insurance contract options to agricultural producers reveals the
government’s desire to have different producers/producers with different attitudes towards
risk choose different insurance coverage contracts. Obviously, if this were not the case, i.e., if
the government wanted all producers to choose the same insurance coverage, it could/would
have, simply, made one crop insurance coverage option available to producers. Put in a different way, the provision of multiple insurance coverage contracts reveals the government’s
desire for the existence of a separating equilibrium where producers with different levels of
risk aversion choose different insurance contracts.
With the producer attitudes towards risk/level of risk aversion being private information,
this represents a typical case of asymmetric information where the type of the agent/informed
party is hidden to the principal/uniformed party. In such a case, the provision of a menu of
contracts is part of the appropriate response of the uninformed party (government in our case)
that desires to resolve the information asymmetry and have different agents/producers choose
the contract designed for them. Subsidies linked to the different contracts (like the premium
subsidies for low- and high-coverage crop insurance policies, in our case) can then be used to
satisfy incentive compatibility and induce different producer groups choose the policies
designed for them [30].
In the context of our study, the provision of low- and high-coverage insurance policies
reveals the government’s desire to have producers with intermediate and high aversion to risk
choose low- and high-coverage crop insurance contract, respectively, with the premium subsidies helping determine the desirable threshold levels of risk aversion (i.e., the levels of risk
aversion that determine the desirable boundaries of “intermediate” and “high” risk aversion)
and the share of producers under each insurance contract.
In the context of the analysis in the previous section, for instance, in addition to increasing
producer participation in crop insurance, subsidizing the low-coverage insurance policy also
changes the share of producers that purchase a high-coverage crop insurance contract as a
number of them find it optimal to switch to the low-coverage policy in the presence of sl. If the
government is interested in maintaining/achieving a certain share of producers in the highcoverage option, then it has to also subsidize the high-coverage policy. Note that, twenty years
after the introduction of 80% and 85% coverage levels in 1999, high-coverage policies grew to
represent 26% of insured acres and 32% of premium subsidies.
To further illustrate this role of premium subsidies, assume that the current levels of producer participation in low- and high-coverage crop insurance are given by xl and xh in Fig 2,
0
0
respectively, and that the government wishes to increase them to xl and xh in the same Figure.
This is equivalent to saying that the government desires producers with risk aversion in excess
0
0
0
of Ah to purchase high-coverage insurance and producers with risk aversion A 2 ðAl ; Ah � to
purchase low-coverage crop insurance. Carefully designing sl and sh, the government can
achieve this (and any other) change in the shares (and, thus, types) of producers choosing the
different insurance coverage contracts, as those shares are, indeed, functions of the relative
subsidies received by the two contracts, i.e.,
0

xl ¼

wh ðb

0

xh ¼
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dÞ wh sh ðb gÞ þ wl sl ðb
ðb gÞðg dÞ

ðg

dÞ

ðwh
g

wl Þ þ ðwh sh
d

wl sl Þ

dÞ

ð12Þ

ð13Þ

8 / 15

PLOS ONE

The role of premium subsidies in crop insurance

Note that, while Fig 2 depicts the case where slwl is less than shwh inducing an increased number of producers to opt for the high-coverage crop insurance contract, the premium subsidies
can be structured such that the share of producers opting for the high-coverage insurance contract is reduced or stays the same. For instance, while ARPA resulted in a regressive proportional scheme of the premium subsidy rates (i.e., sh<sl), the dollar amount of the premium
subsidy can still increase with the coverage level (i.e., shwh > slwl), as the difference in the subsidy rates can be outweighed by the difference in the insurance premiums wh and wl [25]. Fig 3
depicts the case where slwl exceeds shwh and producers who initially had a high-coverage insur0
ance contract (producers with A 2 ðAh ; Ah � in this Figure) find it optimal to switch to low-coverage in the presence of the premium subsidies.
Result 2: Premium subsidies can help induce any desirable separating equilibrium in the
presence of asymmetric information by making the participation of producers with different attitudes towards risk in the policies designed for them incentive compatible.
The change in the structure of premium subsidies by ARPA can be viewed as an attempt to
induce a different separating equilibrium. In 2000, the year before ARPA was enacted, the
average per acre subsidy for low-coverage insurance (i.e., coverage below 80%) was $4.74,
while the average subsidy for high-coverage insurance (i.e., coverage at or above 80%) was
$2.49 per acre [7]. In 2001, the first year ARPA took effect, the average per acre subsidy for
low-coverage insurance increased to $8.29 while the average per acre subsidy for high-coverage insurance increased to $9.23. The percent of acres in a high-coverage contract increased
from 5.9% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2001, a 57.6% change [7].

Fig 3. Market and welfare effects of premium subsidies when slwl < shwh.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250129.g003
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Premium subsidies as means of income redistribution
As Figs 2 and 3 show, the introduction of premium subsidies results in income transfers to
producers that participate in crop insurance. These income transfers depend on the relative
magnitude of the subsidies to the different crop insurance policies, slwl and shwh, and are asymmetric across the different policy participants. Specifically, when slwl is less than shwh (case
depicted in Fig 2), producers enrolling in crop insurance due to the subsidies gain
ZAl
l
Gsi ¼ ðERls ERsi ÞdA, producers with low coverage policy before and after the subsidies
0
l

A

0

ZAh
gain Gll ¼

ERl ÞdA, producers switching from low to high coverage due to the subsi-

ðERls
Al

ZAh
h
l

dies gain G ¼

ðERhs

ERl ÞdA, and producers with high coverage before and after the sub-

0
A
h

Z1
h
h

sidies gain G ¼

ðERhs

ERh ÞdA.

Ah

On the other hand, when slwl exceeds shwh (case depicted in Fig 3), producers enrolling in
ZAl
l
crop insurance due to the subsidies gain Gsi ¼ ðERls ERsi ÞdA, producers with low coverA

0
l

ZAh
l
l

age policy before and after the subsidies gain G ¼

ERl ÞdA, producers switching

ðERls
Al
0

ZAh
from high to low coverage due to the subsidies gain Glh ¼

ðERls

ERh ÞdA, and producers

Ah

Z1
h
h

with high coverage before and after the subsidies gain G ¼

ðERhs

ERh ÞdA.

0
A
h

Since the welfare impacts of subsidies are asymmetric, the optimal sl and sh when the government seeks to transfer income to policy participants will be determined by the relative
weight placed by the government on the different beneficiaries of the policy and the taxpayers
who fund crop insurance [10, 31].
Result 3: Premium subsidies transfer income from taxpayers to agricultural producers that
participate in crop insurance.
As noted earlier, premium subsidies have been growing over time and accounted for $6.26
billion and $6.36 billion in 2018 and 2019, respectively. The low-coverage insurance policies
received $4.2 billion in 2018 and $4.32 billion in 2019, while high-coverage policies received
$2.07 billion in 2018 and $2.04 billion in 2019 [7].
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Discussion of the stated and revealed roles of premium subsidies
As noted earlier, the stated role of premium subsidies is to increase producer participation in
crop insurance. As our analysis has shown, however, if increased producer participation were
the only goal of the government, it could have been achieved much more efficiently by providing subsidies to low-coverage insurance policies only (alternatively, removing the availability
of high coverage contracts and, therefore, the subsidies associated with them, would result in
the same outcome). Such a policy design would have still attracted the desired producer group
to participate in crop insurance and would have avoided the income transfer to existing highcoverage insurance buyers. Based on Result 2, however, one could argue that the provision of
subsidies to both low- and high-coverage insurance contracts is not evidence of a government
desire to transfer income to more risk averse producers but that it reveals, instead, a desire to
induce a certain separating equilibrium (that would not be attainable in the absence of sh).
Given that, as shown earlier (see Result 3), the introduction of the premium subsidies does
result in income transfers from taxpayers to policy participants, the question that naturally
arises (and is at the heart of this research) is whether these transfers are a goal or a necessity for
the desired increased participation (and a separating equilibrium) to emerge. To answer this
question, we need to evaluate whether the government could achieve the desired increased
participation and any separating equilibrium at reduced costs. It turns out that it can, which
makes income redistribution very much a goal of this government policy.
In particular, the government could have achieved the desired increase in producer participation by providing the premium subsidy sl to new participants only. Without a subsidy paid
to producers with low-coverage insurance already in the program, there would be no need for
a subsidy for existing producers with high-coverage insurance to maintain the desired separating equilibrium (and the share/type of producers opting for high-coverage crop insurance).
Fig 4 depicts this mechanism and shows how it can achieve an increased producer participation and maintain the desired separating equilibrium, while saving all the income transfers to
existing policy participants identified in the previous section. It is important to note that,
under this mechanism, the new policy participants would receive the premium subsidy for as
long as the government desired their participation in crop insurance. Existing policy participants (who keep paying the same premium rate) would have no incentive to leave the program
as their expected returns with crop insurance are greater than those without (see Fig 4). In
addition, by participating in the program and purchasing a certain coverage level, a producer
reveals their true type/level of risk aversion. If such producer were to leave the program one
year, they would be able to reenter with the terms that were in place when they were participating (and would not be eligible for new subsidies designed to induce producers that used to
self-insure to enter the program).
Result 4: Providing premium subsidies only to new policy participants can increase the efficiency of the policy in increasing producer participation in crop insurance and inducing a
desired separating equilibrium.
At this point, it is important to reiterate that, while our analysis focuses on the introduction
of new premium subsidies, our results are more general and apply also to cases where the government increases the magnitude of existing subsidies. In such a case, under our proposed
mechanism, it is the increase in the premium subsidy associated with the low-coverage insurance that would be available only to new policy participants (while existing policy participants
would keep paying the premium associated with their chosen insurance coverage policy,
which includes the subsidies already in place). Put in a different way, in cases where the
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Fig 4. Mechanism that increases participation and maintains a separating equilibrium at reduced costs.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250129.g004

goverenment already subsidizes different insurance coverage policies, our proposed mechanism would not remove existing subsidies from current policy participants but would, instead,
make the increase in the current premium subsidies available only to new policy participants.
To assess the magnitude of the savings associated with the implementation of our proposed
policy design, we compare its costs to those of ARPA, focusing on the years before and after
the implementation of this reform. RMA data indicates that ARPA increased producer acreage
enrollment from 206.4 million acres in 2000 to 211.3 million acres in 2001 [7]. With the average premium subsidy for low-coverage insurance after ARPA being $8.29 per acre, our proposed policy design would require $40 million (4.9 million new acres times $8.29 per acre) of
premium subsidies allocated to new participants for the same increase in acreage enrollment
to be achieved. With ARPA costing 820 million (2001 premium subsidies of $1.77 billion less
$951 million in 2000 premium subsidies), our policy design would have saved taxpayers $780
million, or 95% of the new subsidy payments in 2001 alone. Additional savings would be realized in subsequent years as premium subsidies under ARPA have continued to exist.
It is important to note that, in addition to being very efficient, this policy design is also very
flexible. For instance, if an increase in the share of producers purchasing high-coverage policy
were desired, it could be easily achieved by providing sh to existing policy participants. Since sl
to existing policy participants would be zero under this mechanism, the amount of sh that
would be needed for the desired adjustment to occur would be smaller than that under the current policy design. The reason is that, as shown earlier, it is the difference between the subsidies to low- and high-coverage policies that determines the shares of producers opting for the
different policies. Reducing one of them to zero (as the current participants are not subsidized
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under this mechanism) reduces also the size of the other subsidy that is required for the
desired adjustment to occur.
The fact that the government could have achieved its objectives of increasing producer participation and inducing a desired separating equilibrium by subsidizing only new policy participants but chose to provide subsidies to all policy participants (both new and existing ones),
reveals either that income redistribution through crop insurance is very much an objective of
the government or that the current policy design constitutes a policy failure.
Result 5: Income transfers from taxpayers to agricultural producers are an objective of the
crop insurance policy and not a necessary cost of increasing producer participation and
inducing a desired separating equilibrium.

Conclusions
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous producer attitudes towards risk to analyze different, stated and revealed, roles of crop insurance premium subsidies. The stated government
objective of premium subsidies to increase producer participation in crop insurance is evaluated along with their role in inducing the desired producer behavior and a separating equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information, and transferring income from taxpayers to
agricultural producers/policy participants.
The analysis reveals a strong connection and a complementarity between the stated and
revealed policy objectives of the government. Premium subsidies can, indeed, increase producer participation in the program, induce a (any) desired separating equilibrium with producers with different levels of risk aversion choosing different levels of risk coverage, and
result in welfare transfers to agricultural producers.
The study then tests the assertion that the income transfers occurring through premium
subsidies are a necessary cost for increasing producer participation in the program. To do so,
we develop an alternative design of premium subsidies, one in which increased participation
occurs through the provision of subsidies to new policy participants only. The proposed design
can achieve the stated government objective of increased producer participation at reduced
costs and rejects the idea that the income redistribution taking place under the current policy
design is necessary for increasing producer participation in crop insurance.
In fact, the proposed alternative policy design can also be modified to induce any desired
separating equilibrium, also at reduced costs. The presence of a policy design that can achieve
increased producer participation and induce any desired separating equilibrium at reduced
costs reveals that the premium subsidies in the current policy design are either a means of
income redistribution or a policy failure.
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